



VxClass for Incident Response

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Introduction



- Binary code is often left behind by attackers
 - Running processes
 - Dropped executables
 - Kernel memory snapshots
 - Network traffic
 - Crash dumps



Introduction



- Useful evidence but difficult to analyze
- Current methods:
 - Use AV scanner
 - Run executable to provoke/observe behavior
 - Remove packer/obfuscator code
 - Manual analysis using IDA Pro



Current Methods



- Error-prone and time-consuming
- AV signatures are brittle, out of date
- Behavior can be difficult to provoke
- Removal of protection code is difficult
- Manual analysis
 - Does not scale
 - No easy correlation of results



VxClass



- Structural malware classification tool
- Categorizes malware samples into families
- Groups malware that shares code
- Allows correlation between samples
 - Regardless of how they were obtained



VxClass



- Upload of samples through a web server
- Generic unpacking through emulation
- Extraction of structural information
- Comparison with known samples
- Storage of the results in a SQL database
- Visualization of the results in the browser



Uploading

- Upload samples
 - Through a web interface in your browser
 - Through XML-RPC
 - User-based access control to samples:
 - Public: All users can see and download
 - Limited: All users can see, but not download
 - Private: Only original uploader can see and download



Upload

Unpacking

Classification

Statistics

Executable Image Selection

Executable	<input type="text"/>	<input type="button" value="Browse..."/>
Description	<input type="text"/>	

Executable Image Options

Max Ticks (?)	<input type="text" value="1000"/>	<input type="button" value="Million(s)"/> ▾
Access Rights (?)	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Private <input type="radio"/> Limited <input type="radio"/> Public	
Keep in the database	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Unpack executable (?)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Command line	<input type="text"/>	
Filename of the dropped file	<input type="text"/>	
Classify executable (?)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
IDB / IDA Database (?)	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Symbian SIS package (?)	<input type="checkbox"/>	

Upload

Upload Item	<input type="button" value="Submit"/>
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Unpacking

- Generic unpacking is difficult
 - Anti-debugging tricks
 - Attempts to foil emulators
 - Creation of and interaction between multiple processes
 - Code obfuscation



Unpacking

- Our approach: Full system emulation
- Emulated Windows XP SP2 in Bochs
- Run the executable until it looks unpacked
- Acquire memory of all processes and dirty kernel pages
- Use code in acquired memory for classification



Unpacking

- Solved problems
 - Anti-Debugging tricks
 - Legacy API calls
 - Multiple processes
 - Interprocess communication
 - Kernel memory analysis
- Result: Most packers can be unpacked automatically



Comparison



- Problem: Meaningful comparison of binary code
- Byte-by-byte comparison is useless
- Our approach: Structural comparison
 - Award-winning (German IT-Security Award 2006)
 - Uses industry-standard BinDiff engine
 - Uses patent-pending MD-Index (more later)



Structural Comparison




- Extract call graph and flow graph information from samples
- Compare the structure of these graphs instead of byte sequences
- Compares code derived from same source
 - Regardless of compiler settings
 - Regardless of compiler




Address		Basic Block	Address
238ca336	push ebp	push ebp	000585a3
238ca337	mov ebp, esp	mov ebp, esp	000585a4
238ca339	push ecx	sub esp, 18h	000585a6
238ca33a	mov eax, [ebp+8]	mov eax, [ebp+8]	000585a9
238ca33d	and dword ptr [ebp-4], 0	mov eax, [eax+14h]	000585ac
238ca341	push ebx	mov [ebp-10h], eax	000585af
238ca342	mov ebx, [eax+14h]	mov dword ptr [ebp-0Ch], 0	000585b2
238ca345	push esi	mov eax, [ebp-10h]	000585b9
238ca346	push edi	add eax, 0DCh	000585bc
238ca347	lea edi, [ebx+0DCh]	mov [ebp-8], eax	000585c1
238ca34d	jmp short loc_238CA39B	jmp loc_5864F	000585c4
238ca34f	push dword ptr [esi+4]	mov eax, [ebp-4]	000585c9
238ca352	call sub_23808D3C	mov eax, [eax+4]	000585cc
238ca357	test byte ptr [eax], 10h	mov [esp], eax	000585cf
238ca35a	pop ecx	call js_GetGCThingFlags	000585d2
238ca35b	jz short loc_238CA361	movzx eax, byte ptr [eax]	000585d7
		movzx eax, al	000585da
		and eax, 10h	000585dd
		test eax, eax	000585e0
		jz short loc_585EC	000585e2
238ca35d	mov edi, esi	mov eax, [ebp-4]	000585e4
238ca35f	jmp short loc_238CA39B	mov [ebp-8], eax	000585e7
		jmp short loc_5864F	000585ea
238ca361	mov eax, [esi]	mov eax, [ebp-4]	000585ec
238ca363	mov [edi], eax	mov edx, [eax]	000585ef
238ca365	cmp dword ptr [esi+8], 1	mov eax, [ebp-8]	000585f1
238ca369	jnz short loc_238CA39B	mov [eax], edx	000585f4
		mov eax, [ebp-4]	000585f6
		mov eax, [eax+8]	000585f9
		cmp eax, 1	000585fc
		jnz short loc_5864F	000585ff
238ca36b	push dword ptr [esi+44h]	mov eax, [ebp-4]	00058601
238ca36e	push dword ptr [esi+18h]	mov edx, [eax+44h]	00058604
238ca371	call sub_238BC1CD	mov eax, [ebp-4]	00058607
238ca376	test eax, eax	mov eax, [eax+18h]	0005860a
238ca378	pop ecx	mov [esp+4], edx	0005860d
238ca379	pop ecx	mov [esp], eax	00058611
238ca37a	jz short loc_238CA39B	call js_FindFinallyHandler	00058614
		test eax, eax	00058619
		jz short loc_5864F	0005861b
238ca37c	mov eax, esi	mov eax, [ebp-4]	0005861d
238ca37e	call sub_238C9E35	mov [esp], eax	00058620
238ca383	test eax, eax	call CanScheduleCloseHook	00058623
238ca385	jz short loc_238CA39B	test eax, eax	00058628
		jz short loc_5864F	0005862a
238ca387	and dword ptr [esi], 0	mov eax, [ebp-4]	0005862c
238ca38a	cmp dword ptr [ebp-4], 0	mov dword ptr [eax], 0	0005862f
238ca38e	mov eax, [ebp+10h]	mov edx, [ebp+10h]	00058635
238ca391	mov [eax], esi	mov eax, [ebp-4]	00058638
238ca393	mov [ebp+10h], esi	mov [edx], eax	0005863b
238ca396	jnz short loc_238CA39B	mov eax, [ebp-4]	0005863d
		mov [ebp+10h], eax	00058640

Structural Comparison

primary



secondary



Structural Comparison

primary

```
238ca336
a336  push    ebp
a337  mov     ebp, esp
a339  push    ecx
a33a  mov     eax, [ebp+8]
a33d  and     dword ptr[ebp-4], 0
a341  push    ebx
a342  mov     ebx, [eax+14h]
a345  push    esi
a346  push    edi
a347  lea    edi, [ebx+0DCh]
a34d  jmp     short loc_238CA39B
```

```
238ca39b
a39b  mov     esi, [edi]
a39d  test    esi, esi
a39f  jnz    short loc_238CA34F
```

```
238ca34f
a34f  push    dword ptr[esi+4]
a352  call   sub_23808D3C
a357  test    byte ptr[eax], 10h
a35a  pop     ecx
a35b  jz     short loc_238CA361
```

secondary

```
000585a3
85a3  push    ebp
85a4  mov     ebp, esp
85a6  sub     esp, 18h
85a9  mov     eax, [ebp+8]
85ac  mov     eax, [eax+14h]
85af  mov     [ebp-10h], eax
85b2  mov     dword ptr[ebp-0Ch], 0
85b9  mov     eax, [ebp-10h]
85bc  add     eax, 0DCh
85c1  mov     [ebp-8], eax
85c4  jmp     loc_5864F
```

```
0005864f
864f  mov     eax, [ebp-8]
8652  mov     eax, [eax]
8654  mov     [ebp-4], eax
8657  cmp     dword ptr[ebp-4], 0
865b  jnz    loc_585C9
```

```
000585c9
85c9  mov     eax, [ebp-4]
85cc  mov     eax, [eax+4]
85cf  mov     [esp], eax
85d2  call   js_GetGCThingFlags
85d7  movzx  eax, byte ptr[eax]
85da  movzx  eax, al
85dd  and    eax, 10h
85e0  test   eax, eax
85e2  jz     short loc_585EC
```




MD-Index



- Patent-pending
- Clever hash function for directed graphs
- Assigns 80-bit value to a directed graph
 - Allows keeping a database of flow graphs
 - Allows efficient queries into the database
- Is used within VxClass for several purposes:
 - Very fast approximate comparison
 - Code search



Results



- Memory dumps and recovered strings
- IDA files (IDB) of the resulting disassemblies
- Pairwise similarity scores
- Visualisation:
 - Family trees
 - Top-10-most-similar list

Results



Logged in as: root (logout)

Administration | System Configuration | Account Settings |



Upload

Unpacking

Classification

Statistics

Tags

Files

Tree

Select a field to sort by... Sort direction: Ascending Show 200 items per page


Enter your filter expression here

Download EXE Download Dump Examine Dump Download IDB Delete selected

<input type="checkbox"/>	Item Name	Item Description	State	PE Dump	PE State	Time Added
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit wxtest_00a54be8aaf5472f7c7f6dafa...(more)	bulk-upload	Classification successful	Info	Tainted	2009-09-29 10:58:41
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit wxtest_00a9e0ac14395ecdd51ce37df...(more)	bulk-upload	Classification successful	Info	Valid	2009-09-29 10:58:41
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit wxtest_00aa09a0ba645755699cd0f83...(more)	bulk-upload	Classification successful	Info	Tainted	2009-09-29 10:58:41
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit wxtest_00b4b09088d7018ee0d360923...(more)	bulk-upload	Classification successful	Info	Valid	2009-09-29 10:58:41
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit wxtest_00b69f877659659937e2554e5...(more)	bulk-upload	Classification successful	Info	Tainted	2009-09-29 10:58:41
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit wxtest_00b7325455a9df3ff49c93137...(more)	bulk-upload	Classification successful	Info	Tainted	2009-09-29 10:58:42
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit wxtest_00ba8db27e3ab64763ee0d98d...(more)	bulk-upload	Classification successful	Info	Valid	2009-09-29 10:58:43
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit wxtest_00bd5b42e91ced7f6f1b8c992...(more)	bulk-upload	Classification successful	Info	Valid	2009-09-29 10:58:43
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit wxtest_00be0000507d4d0540b0b05...(more)	bulk-upload	Classification successful	Info	Tainted	2009-09-29 10:58:43


Results

Logged in as: root (logout) Administration | System Configuration | Account Settings |


 zynamics VxClass

Upload Unpacking **Classification** Statistics

Tags Files Tree


 Search Regular expression Case sensitive

Overview



Tags

- Win32/Hupigon
- Win32/Allapple**



50%

Results

Logged in as: root (logout) Administration | System Configuration | Account Settings |


zynamics VxClass

Upload Unpacking **Classification** Statistics

Tags Files Tree

Search Regular expression Case sensitive

Overview



Tags

- Win32/Hupigon
- Win32/Allapple**

0.989394

vxtest_0a40c5ab4e2c4bce110c2fbc2572d512.exe.58

0.99022

0.983815

vxtest_0a40c5ab4e2c4bce110c2fbc2572d512.exe->urdrvxc.exe.592


0.987876

0.982545

vxtest_0a5ca2969df374f84411cec8693802ad.exe->'KERNEL_MEMORY'.167

50%

Architecture





Case Studies



- Noise reduction
 - Automatically filter uninteresting samples
- Knowledge management
 - Share information between analysts
- Attacker Correlation
 - Is a set of attacks performed with one toolset
- Code searching
 - Find certain functions in known samples

Noise Reduction



- Upload new files to the system
- How similar are they to interesting samples ?
 - Comparison to database of known samples
- Prioritize accordingly



Knowledge management



- Each analyst uploads samples he knows to VxClass
- New malware comes in, gets uploaded
- VxClass determines which known samples this is similar to
- The expert for similar samples can be found

Attacker Correlation



- A series of incidents is investigated
- On a large number of machines, code is found
- Classify the code using VxClass to find out:
 - Is this one group of attackers ?
 - Is this similar to attacks seen in the past ?



Code Searching



- A particularly strange piece of code (just one function) is identified
 - Perhaps a strange encryption function
- Does this particular piece of code appear in other samples in the database ?
- Search is not byte-based, but flow graph based (MD-Index)
- The answer is one click away



Performance

- One VxClass machine
 - 800-1600 samples per day
- Performance depends on
 - Obfuscation complexity
 - Size of the malware
 - Size of the database
- Can be fully parallelized
 - The only bottleneck is the central database



Behavioral Analysis



- VxClass is **not** a behavioral-analysis tool
- VxClass is **complementary** to such tools
- We recommend combining VxClass with behavior-monitoring tools such as
 - CWSandbox (<http://www.cwsandbox.org>)
 - Anubis (Free) (<http://anubis.iseclabs.org>)



VxClass Options



- VxClass on a single machine
 - Run it inside your organisation
- VxClass distributed
 - Scale it to your needs
- VxClass as service
 - We host a machine for you
- VxClass as shared service
 - We host a machine for you
 - Multiple clients use a shared database



Existing Customers

- The German BSI
 - Agency for security in information systems
- Vodafone Germany
 - Pre-filters Symbian/ARM executables
- Other government entities and private companies
- Mostly used for attacker correlation and noise filtering



Limitations

- Heavy obfuscation of control flow
- Virtualizing packers
- Unpacking only works on 32-bit Windows
 - No Linux / OSX / Mobile unpacking
 - 64 bit support is in the works
- Upload of IDBs allows heavy manual intervention beforehand



FAQ

- What OS does it run on ?
 - It runs on a 64-bit Debian Lenny install
- Does it have any network dependencies ?
 - No
- How can we extend the system ?
 - All generated data is accessible through XML-RPC
 - If needed, direct access to the SQL can be used
 - The SQL schema is available on request



Other questions ?

